OPS also posted the draft report on its web site for 30 days of public review and solicited comments, which were considered in the final report. In addition, Baker interviewed pipeline operators and other groups with known experience in SCC to ensure an industry-wide perspective. To prepare the report, Baker subcontracted portions of the review to multiple consulting and testing organizations with extensive SCC experience. ![]() Inc., Moon Township, Pa., to prepare a comprehensive report regarding the state of the pipeline industry's collective knowledge about SCC in buried pipelines. One of the topics discussed at the SCC workshop was the OPS contract with Michael Baker Jr. The workshop brought together multiple pipeline industry trade associations (e.g., American Petroleum Institute, Association of Oil Pipelines, Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, American Gas Association, and NACE International) 5 to discuss increased regulatory concern regarding the SCC threat to pipeline safety and to provide industry a forum for the discussion of SCC phenomena in both gas and hazardous liquid pipelines. In December 2003, RSPA-OPS and the National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives (NAPSR) cosponsored an SCC workshop in Houston. Regulators are seeking methods to determine and monitor the relative frequency of SCC and develop new technologies that will assist in the identification and reduction of SCC-related threats to pipeline safety. Incident statistics indicate SCC contributes to fewer uncontrolled releases of gas and hazardous liquids than other known threats to pipeline integrity, such as third-party damage and external corrosion. 2 3 OPS issued an advisory bulletin to owners and operators of gas and hazardous liquid pipelines, stressing that the threat of SCC should be considered when developing and implementing Integrity Management Plans. Recent revisions of Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 192 and 195 incorporate Integrity Management Rules that address threats to pipeline integrity. In addition, subsequent assessments of other hazardous liquid pipelines have revealed indications of SCC not previously identified. In 2003, three failures involving hazardous liquid pipelines were attributed to SCC. Until recently, more pipeline failures involving SCC were reported for natural gas pipelines than for hazardous liquid pipelines. Subsequent industry experience has revealed that SCC can occur in a variety of soils and climates on any continent with a significant pipeline network. Initially, incidents identified as SCC were limited to gas transmission pipelines installed in heavy clay soils along the US Gulf Coast. ![]() ![]() Before that incident, SCC on buried pipelines was previously unknown multiple agencies and organizations performed extensive examinations before the Natchitoches failure attributed to SCC.Īnother gas transmission pipeline failure was attributed to SCC in 1966. The first known case of SCC was identified in 1965 following a gas transmission pipeline rupture near Natchitoches, La. This article summarizes significant findings from the review. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, formerly Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) recently commissioned a review of the pipeline industry's experience with SCC to establish a baseline of the collective knowledge and best practices to successfully mange the SCC threat. Stress-corrosion cracking (SCC) of buried pipelines is one of several identified integrity threats for pipeline systems.
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